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Abstract
Firms innovation portfolios include several dimensions ranging
from organizational aspects to cost reduction and product character-
istics. All of these e¤orts take place during the product life cycle, and
interact with each other in determining the spectrum of features of the
product and its performance on the market. This paper contributes
to the related theoretical debate, focussing on the possibility of having
superior product quality levels at lower marginal production cost over
time. To deal with this issue, we investigate the optimal R&D portfo-
lio of a single-product monopolist investing in cost-reducing activities
accompanied by e¤orts improving the quality of its product over an
innite time horizon. It turns out that the rms relative incentives
along the two directions are conditional upon market a­ uence, mea-
sured by consumerswillingness to pay for quality, and R&D e¤orts
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are complements in the neighbourhood of the steady state equilibrium.
However, the dynamics of the two R&D controls depend on both qual-
ity and marginal cost at every instant. Consequently, as the stability
analysis reveals, the steady state equilibrium is indeed unstable due to
the dynamics of marginal cost, thereby implying that one should not
expect the rm to supply an increasing quality level at a decreasing
production cost. Hence, the dynamic interplay between R&D controls
and the resulting instability a¤ecting production costs also imply that
one may not expect to observe product quality to increase and market
price to decrease over the product life cycle.
Keywords: Process innovation; Monopoly; Product quality; R&D
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1 Introduction
Firmsincentives to innovate in several directions have received a large amount
of attention in the existing literature, where, traditionally, innovation may af-
fect the product characteristics or marginal production cost (see, e.g., Tirole,
1988; and Reinganum, 1989, among others). The endogenous connections
between multidimensional innovation and demand and industry evolution
have been extensively studied in the debate on product life cycle (see Aber-
nathy and Utterback, 1975, 1978; and Adner and Levinthal, 2001, among
many others). The resulting view holds it that product innovation necessar-
ily precedes process innovation, this perception being reinforced by empirical
evidence (Damanpour and Gopalakrishanan, 2001).
However, the reverse case is also observed (Barras, 1986) as well as the
simultaneous presence of product improvement and cost abatement (Pine et
al., 1993).
The latter constitutes our point of departure in this paper, where we
want to outline some features of the technological evolution over time of a
product which is being modied while being already marketed, initial inno-
vations having allowed the rm to supply a product characterised a marginal
cost which is su¢ ciently low to ensure positive demand. Another essential
component of the spectrum of product characteristics is quality, as perceived
from the consumersviewpoint. The interplay between market power and
the resulting price/quality ratio is an issue that has been lively debated in
the extant literature belonging to the theory of industrial organization ever
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since the pioneering research by Spence (1975) and Mussa and Rosen (1978).
In particular, one of the pivotal elements of this discussion has been the mo-
nopolists incentive to distort quality downward to extract as much surplus
as possible from consumers.1
This has been done taking the e¢ ciency level of the rmsproduction
technology (i.e., marginal cost) as given. More often than not, marginal cost
has been entirely left out of the picture for the sake of simplicity. However,
doing so, the extant debate on product quality distortions has almost en-
tirely left out of the picture a relevant question which can be formulated in
the following terms: may R&D e¤orts aimed at decreasing production costs
be accompanied by similar investment aimed at increasing product quality
while the product is being marketed? Put di¤erently, would it be possible to
supply a product whose quality gets higher at a lower marginal cost? This
would allow rms to increase the mark-up simultaneously in two directions
by commanding a higher price via a higher quality level, accompanied by a
lower unit production cost. That is, might a rm get two eggs in one basket?
Surprisingly enough, the existing literature in this area of industrial eco-
nomics o¤ers little material of this kind, featuring a few contributions where
product quality is not explicitly taken into account. Indeed, in Lin and Saggi
1Further contributions in this vein are those of Itoh (1983), Maskin and Riley (1984),
and Champsaur and Rochet (1989). For an overview, see Lambertini (2006). Moreover,
there exists a similar but not strictly related discussion in the eld of business and manage-
ment, where product quality is a relevant variable in shaping rmsadvertising campaigns.
For exhaustive surveys, see Feichtinger et al. (1994) and Erickson (2003).
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(2002), Rosenkranz (2003) and Lambertini and Mantovani (2009, 2010) prod-
uct di¤erentiation is modelled in terms of a representative consumers pref-
erence for variety rather than quality, and rmsproduct innovation e¤orts
modify a degree of product di¤erentiation which has no explicit relationship
with quality. Two relevant exceptions are Bonanno and Haworth (1988) and
Veldman and Gaalman (2014). Bonanno and Haworth (1988) use a static dis-
crete choice model with vertical di¤erentiation à la Mussa and Rosen (1978)
to investigate the impact of Bertrand and Cournot competition on process
innovation and quality improvements, while Veldman and Gaalman (2014)
focus on the role of strategic delegation in shaping bidimensional innovation
incentives in a model where product quality enters the utility function of a
representative consumer buying a basket of all goods available on the market,
to show that the presence of managers endowed with appropriate incentives
enhances both cost-reducing and quality-enhancing activities.
It is worth recalling the relevant further contribution by Hayes andWheel-
wright (1984), where a detailed description of a 4-steps framework is proposed
in order to help manufacturing organizations achieve their strategic goals. In
their approach, product innovation and process innovation are viewed as
di¤erent steps in an optimization path together with a number of distinct
characteristics of the production procedures. Subsequent related literature
(e.g., the works by Damanpour and Gopalakrishanan, 1994, 2001) treat the
relationships between process innovation and product innovation empirically,
in oligopoly contexts. These contributions analyse the timing of such innova-
tions, assuming both of them are implemented. To some extent, our analysis
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is coherent with theirs, in the sense that we are also admitting the presence
of both kinds of innovation. However, we focus our attention on the behav-
iour over time of the R&D e¤orts exerted by the rm once the product is on
the market and its quality and production cost are simultaneously modied
during the product life cycle.
In line of principle, one could think that it would be desirable to simul-
taneously have quality increasing and unit production cost decreasing over
time, from both the demand and the supply side standpoints. As to whether
this may happen, empirical evidence and casual observation are both contro-
versial, and suggest this might not be the case. An example can be found in
the car industry. In particular, green hybrid cars are costlier (to producers
and consumers alike) than brown ones, all else equal, for two reasons: the
rst is that market price is set so as to allow rms to abate the large initial
R&D investments required to invent, design and put into production elec-
trical power units; the second is that the marginal production costs of the
assembled nal product is largely a¤ected by the marginal production costs of
hybrid propulsion. If indeed green quality is perceived as higher than the old
style brown one, then in this case higher product quality goes hand in hand
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with higher marginal costs and market prices.2 A similar picture emerges if
one considers energy supply. In this case, photovoltaic panels may at most
a¤ord to convert about 20% of incoming sunlight into electricity, with the
resulting kW/h costing several times more than a kW/h obtained from any
combination of fossil sources, which remains true if we compare a combina-
tion of renewables and nonrenewable energy sources in general. Windmills
might seem an exception in this respect, as they require large upfront costs
but very low operating costs and are already supplying energy at a fraction
of the unit cost associated with coal plants (cf. Smil, 2010). However, energy
from windmills is heavily a¤ected by storage problems and is not available
on call.3 Considering that the ensuing model investigates an industry for
nondurables, the case of energy supply appears to t our setup and reect
its main results.
Now we can illustrate the theoretical setup, addressing the joint presence
of process and product innovation through an optimal control model describ-
2This theme is receiving a growing amount of attention in models at the intersection
between the theory of industrial organization and environmental economics. See Arora
and Gangopadhyay (1995), Bansal and Gangopadhyay (2003) and Amacher et al. (2004).
For a model where green high-quality goods explicitly involve higher marginal production
costs than brown low-quality ones, see André et al. (2009) and Lambertini and Tampieri
(2012).
3In computing total and marginal production costs, one should also account for the
additional costs associated with a widespread adoption of renewable energy sources, such
as those associated with energy density (i.e., the number of kW/h per km2), which is
considerably lower than that of fossil fuels. See Smil (2003, 2008).
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ing a prot-maximising monopolist activating a bidimensional R&D portfo-
lio over an innite horizon. Cost-reducing and quality-enhancing e¤orts are
controls, while marginal production cost and product quality are the state
variables. Although, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that the two state
dynamics are decoupled, i.e., each state appears in its own dynamic equation
only, it turns out that the control dynamics are not decoupled. This adds a
desirable pinch of realism to the model and plays a crucial role in shaping the
essential features of the outcome of our analysis. Indeed, the stability analy-
sis reveals that, as a direct consequence of this feature, the equilibrium is
unstable. In particular, what triggers instability is marginal production cost,
whose dynamics o¤sets the rms R&D e¤orts along that dimension. Hence,
the bottom line of our analysis is that the monopolist cannot get two eggs in
one basket and consequently consumers cannot expect to see quality rising
at a progressively lower marginal cost, precisely because of the cross-e¤ects
existing between states and controls in the R&D portfolio of the rm.
This is in sharp contrast with Lambertini and Orsini (2015), to the best
of our knowledge the single work which has previously investigated the same
topic in a similar setup, which di¤ers from ours for a single but essential
feature. In Lambertini and Orsini (2015), the monopoly equilibrium is stable
because the two dimensions of the rms R&D portfolio are independent of
each other and no cross e¤ects between states and controls appear.4 This
4More precisely, the dynamic equation of the R&D control for process (resp., product)
innovation contains only the marginal cost (resp., the quality level). As a result, the
Jacobian matrix of the dynamic system is block diagonal and the steady state is a saddle
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property, intuitively, is quite demanding and cannot be expected to hold in
general.
An explicit aim of the ensuing analysis is in fact to show what happens in
a more realistic situation where each R&D e¤ort is a¤ected by both states.
In short, we show that if the e¤ectiveness of R&D appearing in the state
dynamics is independent of the level of the relevant state variable (either
quality or marginal cost), then the model is unstable and this does not al-
low the rm to increase quality and simultaneously decrease price over the
product life cycle because of production cost instability. This reveals that,
in order to reach a non-explosive steady state equilibrium, the rm should
design its R&D projects by looking for innovation technologies whose returns
to scale (either increasing or decreasing) explicitly characterise the evolution
of the targeted states.
A last remark is in order. The analysis is carried out in a model where
environmental implications of either production or consumption are not ex-
plicitly modelled. However, linking our results to the existing debate on
environmental quality, from the present setup there emerge interesting impli-
cations concerning the possibility of attaining green technologies at marginal
costs comparable with those of brown ones.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 illustrates
the setup. The equilibrium analysis is carried out in Section 3, while Section
4 contains the stability analysis. In Section 5, an alternative version of the
model, a¤ected by learning-by-doing behaviour in technology development,
point equilibrium.
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is presented. Concluding remarks are in Section 6.
2 The setup
Our model describes a market supplied by a single-product monopoly selling
a nondurable good of quality q (t) > 0 at price p (t) > 0 over continuous
time t 2 [0;1) : The population of consumers has a constant size  > 0;
and each consumer is characterised by a marginal willingness to pay for
quality  2 [0;] : Parameter  is usually interpreted as a proxy of income or
wealth (see Tirole, 1988, ch. 2). The population of consumers is uniformly
distributed with density 1 over such interval.5 At any time t 2 [0;1) ; each
individual is assumed to buy a single unit of the good or nothing at all.
The utility function we are going to employ dates back to Mussa and
Rosen (1978) and has been widely used in the ensuing literature on oligopolis-
tic models with vertically di¤erentiated goods initiated by Gabszewicz and
Thisse (1979). It is also the same used in Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995)
and Bansal and Gangopadhyay (2003), where quality has an environmental
value, whereby polluting emissions decrease in the quality level. In their
approach, to which we will come back in Section 4, consumers are envi-
ronmentally concerned and demand green innovations on the part of rms,
5In the literature based on this approach, it is often assumed that density is 1=; in
such a way that the population of consumers is equal to one. In itself, this is a quite
specic assumption. Additionally, as long as the distribution of consumers is rectangular,
choosing any specic value of density has no impact on the qualitative properties of the
ensuing analysis, and therefore we assume unit density.
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consumer awareness acting as a substitute for regulation. The net surplus of
an individual indexed by  2 [0;] is
U() = q (t)  p (t)  0; (1)
if the purchase takes place, otherwise it is nil. The consumer indi¤erent
between buying or not is indexed by b(t) = p (t) =q (t) ; accordingly, the
instantaneous inverse demand function is
p (t) = [  x (t)] q (t) ; (2)
where x (t) is output.6 Turning to the supply side, some specic hypotheses
have to be adopted. We are assuming that the entire R&D activity is carried
out in house by the integrated rm.7 The monopolist is bearing instantaneous
costs due to output production and to both process and product innovation.
The total cost function borne by the rm at any time t is
C (t) = c (t)x (t) + bk2 (t) + sy2 (t) (3)
where c (t) is marginal production cost; k (t) is the instantaneous R&D ef-
fort for quality improvement; y (t) is the e¤ort for process innovation (cost
6In Balasubramanian and Bhardwaj (2004) and by Veldman and Gaalman (2014) quan-
tity is linear in the di¤erence between qualities. Their approach models demand in a repre-
sentative consumer setup with quasi-linear preferences. Here, we adopt instead the discrete
choice approach where every consumer buys a single unit of the product characterised by
the preferred price-quality ratio.
7For an assessment of the bearings of outsourcing on quality improvement, and the
related contractual design, see El Ouardighi and Kim (2010) and El Ouardighi and Kogan
(2013), inter alia.
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reduction); and b and s are positive constants. The convexity of R&D costs
along both dimensions of innovation account for decreasing returns to R&D
activity. Product quality and marginal production cost are state variables,
each of them being a¤ected by a specic R&D e¤ort for either product or
process innovation. The resulting state equations describing the evolutions
of q (t) and c (t) are:

q (t) = k (t)  q (t) (4)
and

c (t) =  y (t) + c (t) : (5)
The di¤erential equations (4-5) are linear and feature exogenous obsolescence
(or decay) rates of quality and productive e¢ ciency,  and , both positive
and time-invariant.8 State dynamics (4-5) are the same as in Li and Ni (2016,
p. 105), while in Lambertini and Orsini (2015, p. 371) they are dened as

q (t) = [k (t)  ] q (t) and c (t) = [ y (t) + ] c (t) ; respectively. This alter-
native formulation postulates a proportional impact of R&D, which depends
on the current level of either state. This amounts to saying that decreasing
(or increasing) returns to R&D activity appear in the state equations. Look
for instance at the dynamics of marginal cost, and suppose c (t) is positive but
arbitrarily close to zero. If so, then even a very large R&D e¤ort would have
a negligible impact, contrary to what happens in (5). Exactly the opposite
applies along the quality dimension, as higher quality levels boost the e¤ect
8We are supposing that R&D has an immediate impact. This is admittedly a simpli-
fying and unrealistic assumption which, however, is commonly adopted.
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of any given R&D e¤ort in this direction. Indeed, all of this is assumed away
in (4-5), where the increase in quality and the decrease in marginal cost are
both independent of their respective current levels at any time, and one only
observes decreasing returns relegated into the convexity of the instantaneous
cost function (3) only. As we shall see in the remainder, this feature plays a
crucial role in shaping the resulting outcome and its properties.
Given (2-3), the monopolists instantaneous prots are
 () = p (t)x (t)  C (t) = [(  x (t)) q (t)  c (t)]x (t)  bk2 (t)  sy2 (t) :
(6)
Therefore, the rm must solve the following innite horizon problem:
max
x(t);k(t);y(t)
Z 1
0
e t

[(  x (t)) q (t)  c (t)]x (t)  bk2 (t)  sy2 (t) dt; (7)
The alternative between price-setting and quantity-setting behaviour being
of course immaterial in a monopoly model.
The dynamic constraints of problem (7) are described by the state equa-
tions (4) and (5), which are endowed with initial conditions q (0) = q0 > 0;
c (0) = c0 2 (0;q0) ; indicating the positivity of both quality and marginal
production cost levels at the initial time. It is worth observing that condition
c0 < q0 requires the initial marginal production cost to be strictly lower
than the spending capability of the richest consumer in this market, in order
for demand to be positive at t = 0. Finally, future prots are discounted at
the constant rate  > 0.
To recap the technical setup, the monopolistic rm has to solve a dy-
namic optimization problem with three control variables and two state vari-
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ables. The solution approach we are going to adopt involves the open-loop
information structure (or equilibrium).
3 Equilibrium analysis
The rms current value Hamiltonian is9
H = e t

 + 

q + 

c

(8)
where  = et and  =  et are the costate variables (evaluated at time
t) associated with q and c, respectively. The resulting rst order conditions
(FOCs) on controls and costate equations are (exponential discounting is
omitted for brevity):
@H
@x
= (  2x) q   c = 0 (9)
@H
@k
=  2bk +  = 0 (10)
@H
@y
=  2sy    = 0 (11)

 =  @H
@q
+  ()

 = ( + )  x (  x) (12)

 =  @H
@c
+  ()  = (  )+ x: (13)
The accompanying set of transversality conditions is limt!1 qe t = 0 and
limt!1 ce t = 0.
9Henceforth, we shall omit the explicit indication of the time argument for the sake of
brevity.
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The FOC (9) can be solved in a quasi-static way to obtain the optimal
instantaneous output x =
q   c
2q
; so that monopoly price is p =
q + c
2
:
Before proceeding, we may formulate
Lemma 1 For any given admissible pair of states (q; c), optimal output x 2
(0;) :
Proof. To prove the Lemma, it su¢ ces to observe that x 2 (0;) i¤
p=q 2 (0;) : Now, p

q
=
q + c
2q
is surely positive and   p

q
=
q   c
2q
> 0
due to the fact that q > p  c in order to enable the richest consumer to
buy, either at the monopoly price or, a fortiori, at a competitive price equal
to marginal cost.
The result stated in Lemma 1 tells that the monopolist will never cover the
entire market throughout the innite time horizon, for any generic product
quality and marginal production cost. This, in addition to conrming the
obvious restrictive e¤ect of monopoly power on output decisions, implies that
we shall not deal with corner solutions in the remainder of the analysis.
Hence, we may proceed with the characterization of optimal R&D e¤orts.
From (10-11), we have the optimal instantaneous controls at any time t:
k = max

0;

2b

; y = max
n
0;  
2s
o
(14)
and the control equations

k =


2b
;

y =  


2s
(15)
which, using (10-11) and (14), can be rewritten as follows:

k =
c2 + [8bk ( + ) 2] q2
8bq2
(16)
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
y =
c+ [4sy (  ) ] q
4sq
(17)
The system composed by (4-5) and (16-17) identies the state-control system
of the dynamic problem at hand. Before proceeding any further, it is impor-
tant to stress that both state variables simultaneously appear in both control
equations. This implies that the two dimensions of the rms R&D portfolio
are not independent of each other. More explicitly, the two dynamic control
equations are not separable w.r.t. states, this being a direct consequence of
the lack of additive separability in the instantaneous prot function (6). The
relevant consequences of this feature of the model will become evident in the
remainder, in connection with the stability analysis.
Imposing stationarity on states and controls yields
kSS =
(qSS   cSS) (qSS + cSS)
8bq2SS ( + )
(18)
ySS =
qSS   cSS
4sqSS (  ) (19)
Note that, since q   c > 0 necessarily, then kSS > 0. As to y; this
is positive i¤  > ; i.e., the process innovation e¤ort is positive provided
that the rms impatience outweighs the rate of depreciation of technology.
Therefore, in the remainder, we shall assume  > , otherwise marginal cost
would increase (which would imply that the system cannot reach a steady
state). We can now proceed to impose stationarity on (5), which delivers the
following steady state value of marginal cost:
cSS =
qSS
1 + 4sqSS (  )  (20)
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Now we can compare kSS and ySS to see that kSS > ySS for all
 >
b ( + ) [1 + 4sqSS (  ) ]
s (  ) [1 + 2sqSS (  ) ]  ky (21)
Relying on the above expression and Lemma 1, we can claim the following:
Proposition 2 Take  >  > 0: At the steady state,  > max fky; cSS=qSSg
su¢ ces to ensure kSS > ySS > 0:
Proposition 2 conveys the intuitive message that the equilibrium R&D
e¤ort for quality improvement is higher than the e¤ort exerted for process
innovation if the marginal willingness to pay for quality of the richest con-
sumer in the market is high enough (or, equivalently, if consumersa­ uence
is su¢ ciently high): richer consumers with hedonic tastes are keen on paying
higher prices for superior quality levels, which makes marginal cost abate-
ment comparatively less relevant, and the rm is happy to react accordingly
along the two R&D dimensions.
A supplementary discussion can be carried out about the presence of
complementarity or substitutability between the two forms of innovation, in
line with an existing discussion in the literature (see Lambertini, 2003, 2004;
and Lin, 2004, inter alia). At rst sight, judging from (18-19), one would
be tempted to conclude that, in the present model, product and process
innovation are independent of each other, as @kSS=@ySS = @ySS=@kSS = 0:
This conclusion, however, can be swept away by observing that both
states appear in (18-19), and therefore one can carry out a simple exercise
to single out the nature of the inuence exerted by one type of innovation
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on the other. This can be done by relying on (18-20) to assess the e¤ects of
a slight variation in q in the neighbourhood of the steady state:
@kSS
@ySS
=
@kSS=@qSS
@ySS=@qSS
=
s (  )
b ( + ) [1 + 4sqSS (  ) ] > 0 (22)
for all  > : This analysis can be summarised in
Lemma 3 Process and product innovation are complements in the neigh-
bourhood of equilibrium.
That is, provided both e¤orts are positive, each one boosts the other in
the neighbourhood of the steady state, thereby fostering the global innovative
content of the monopolists product.10 The intuitive explanation of this result
is that any reduction in c and any increase in q increase the protability of
the rm. The rst implication is obvious as a lower marginal cost produces a
higher prot margin, all else equal; the second can be understood noting that
higher quality levels expand the gross spending capability (measured by the
product q) of any consumer, and therefore contribute to expanding sales by
attracting additional consumers that would be unwilling to purchase lower
qualities. The synergy between the two dimensions of the R&D portfolio
highlighted in Lemma 3 is in line with empirical evidence, as we know since
Cohen and Klepper (1996) and Damanpour and Gopalakrishanan (2001).
There remains to identify the steady state level of quality. To this aim,
we have to impose stationarity on (4), which, using (18) and (20), now writes
10The same can be shown to apply at any t, using (10-13). The related calculations are
omitted for brevity.
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as follows:

q =
2s (  ) q [1 + 2sq (  ) ]
b (+ ) [1 + 4sq (  ) ]2   q: (23)
For future reference, note that the r.h.s. of the above equation is discontin-
uous in correspondence of
q =   1
4s (  )   eq < 0: (24)
Solving

q = 0; we obtain three roots, q = 0 and
q =
 4b ( + ) + 
h
s (  )  p 	
i
16bs ( + ) (  )  (25)
with    s (  )  and 	  2s (  )  + 8b ( + ) : Note that q 2 R
and q  <  1= [4s (  ) ] < 0 in the whole admissible range of parameters,
as can be easily ascertained. Since q  0 is economically inadmissible, we
are left with a single candidate, qSS = q+ > 0 for all
 >
s
b ( + ) 
s (  )   q > 0: (26)
Likewise, it can be easily established that kSS; ySS; xSS and SS are positive
i¤ > q: The above expression must be evaluated against (21), which now
can be rewritten as follows:
ky =
2b ( + )  s (  )
s (  )  > 0 (27)
for all b > s (  ) = [2 ( + )]  b; with
ky > q 8 b > s (  )
( + ) 
 b
ky 2 (0;q) 8 b 2
 
0; b

:
(28)
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The foregoing discussion can be summarised in the following Figures 1-2.
Figure 1 portrays the case  > q: In this range, the dynamics of q; illus-
trated by the horizontal arrows, shows that q+ is not only positive but also
stable. The vertical dashed line indicates the discontinuity at eq.
Figure 1: Dynamics of q,  > q:
6
-
- 

q
qeq
The alternative situation occurring in the parameter range identied by
 2 (0;q) can be disregarded as it is not economically meaningful: in this
case, indeed, product quality drops to zero at the steady state equilibrium,
which also involves that sales are nil since consumers are unwilling to buy.
Figure 2 o¤ers a partition of the parameter space fb;g in which one can
appreciate the bearings of market a­ uence and the steepness of R&D costs
for product innovation on product quality and the relative weights of process
and product innovation at the steady state equilibrium.
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Looking at Figure 2, we must restrict our attention to the region dened
by  > q; since below the curve q all equilibrium magnitudes are negative.
We can formulate the following:
Proposition 4 Take  >  > 0; and consider the range  > q:
 in area I,  > max fq;kyg : Here, qSS = q+ > 0 and kSS > ySS;
 in area II,  2 (q;ky) : Here, qSS = q+ > 0 but kSS < ySS:
The second claim appearing in the above Proposition says that, for in-
termediate levels of , although equilibrium quality is positive, the level of
the richest consumers marginal willingness to pay is low enough to modify
the R&D portfolio of the rm in such a way that it nds convenient to put
a higher e¤ort in process rather than in product innovation.
21
Figure 2: Equilibrium analysis in the space fb;g.
6
-

bb b
I
II
(0; 0)
ky
q
  





















To complement the analysis, one can look at the welfare consequences of
the rms decision. Dene social welfare as SW =  + CS; with
CS =
Z 
p=q
(q   p) d (29)
measuring consumer surplus. A standard question is whether the monopo-
lists behaviour, aimed at prot maximization, produces a welfare distortion
along the quality dimension, and if so, of what sign. To this aim, use (18-19)
and (20) to write
CS (cSS; ySS; kSS) =
2s2q3 (  )2 22
[1 + 4sq (  ) ]2 (30)
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In correspondence of qSS; prot is maximised and therefore, if (30) is monotone
w.r.t. q; then monopoly quality is necessarily socially ine¢ cient in the neigh-
bourhood of the steady state. In particular, it can be easily veried that
(30) is monotonically increasing in q, which implies that the rm under-
supplies product quality at the steady state: a benevolent social planner
would welcome any increase in q to benet consumers, given the equilibrium
price-quantity schedule and the corresponding amount of bidimensional R&D
chosen by the rm. This reproduces in a dynamic setup a result dating back
to Spence (1975) and Mussa and Rosen (1978).
4 Stability analysis
Here we come to the core of our investigation. The stability properties of the
dynamic model can be assessed using Dockners (1985) method (as illustrated
in Dockner and Feichtinger, 1991).
Substituting the instantaneous optimal controls fx; y; kg into (8), we
can write the maximised Hamiltonian as follows:
H = sq
2 + b [cs (c+ 2q) + q (sq
 + 2)]
4bsq
(31)
where   2  and 
  2 4. Then, we can construct the following
4 4 Jacobian matrix:
J =
24 H!z H!!
 Hzz I  Hz!
35 (32)
where each H is a 22 matrix of second-order partial derivatives, z (q; c)
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is the state vector, !  (; ) is the costate vector and I is the 2 2 identity
matrix. Hence, (32) rewrites as
J =
2666666664
  0 1
2b
0
0  0
1
2s
  c
2
2q3
c
2q2
+  0
c
2q2
  1
2q3
0    
3777777775
(33)
whose determinant is
J =
c2s  bq2 ( + )  [1 + 4sq (  ) ]
4bsq3
(34)
where   (  ) : At fcSS; qSSg, (34) is
J =

h
8b ( + ) + s2 p
i
4b
(35)
where
  s 8b ( + )  + s2 (36)
and it can be easily shown that the r.h.s. of (35) is strictly negative for
all  > . As we know from Dockner and Feichtinger (1991, Lemma 2, pp.
35-36), this is necessary and su¢ cient for one eigenvalue of J to be negative
and the other three to be positive (or, for one to be positive and two with
positive real parts). The four eigenvalues can be calculated using the formula
in Dockner and Feichtinger (1991, Lemma 1, p. 35), the single negative one
being associated to product quality. Consequently, we may formulate the
following result:
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Proposition 5 In the parameter region where ySS > 0; the dynamic monopoly
model with a bidimensional R&D portfolio produces a one-dimensional stable
manifold. The single stable branch is that describing quality improvement.
This fact has an immediate and clear-cut consequence:
Corollary 6 The monopolists R&D portfolio is unstable, due to the dy-
namic properties of the branch describing the behaviour of marginal produc-
tion cost.
This amounts to saying that one should anticipate upward jumps in the
marginal cost level, which of course will reverberate onto the other state
variable, causing perturbations in the quality level as well. This feature is
generated by the fact that the Jacobian matrix (33) is a not a block diago-
nal one, and suggests that the common observation whereby higher quality
products are supplied at higher marginal cost might well be the consequence
of the interplay between the two state dynamics - or, as it appears from the
control equations (16-17), between the R&D e¤ortsdynamics - rather than
an intrinsic economic property of higher quality goods per se.
Additionally, should quality have an environmental interpretation,11 as
in Arora and Gangopadhyay (1995), Bansal and Gangopadhyay (2003) and
11This theme is receiving a growing amount of attention in models at the intersection
between the theory of industrial organization and environmental economics. For a model
where green high-quality goods explicitly involve higher marginal production costs than
brown low-quality ones, see André et al. (2009) and Lambertini and Tampieri (2012).
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Amacher et al. (2004), the foregoing analysis would imply that green in-
novations taking the form of superior quality levels could not be expected
to be attained at the same marginal cost as older (brown) goods or tech-
nologies. Considering also welfare implications, the downward quality dis-
tortion induced by prot incentives highlighted at the end of the previous
section would also reduce the greenness of such innovations, curtailing welfare
through an increase in polluting emissions and the associated environmental
damage adding up to the obvious reduction in consumer surplus.
To interpret the arising of instability, one has to look back at the state-
control system made up by (4-5) and (16-17). As noted above, (4-5) illustrate
a situation in which the e¤ects of R&D are independent of the levels of states,
which, in combination with the simultaneous appearance of both states in
the control equations (16-17), clearly implies that the resulting Jacobian ma-
trix is not block diagonal, with instability emerging via the marginal cost
dynamics (see the Appendix). This also yields a clearcut indication con-
cerning corporate strategy: in order to avoid instability, the rm - if at all
possible - should design the composition of its innovation portfolio to include
R&D activities whose nature can be described by state dynamics incorpo-
rating decreasing or increasing returns to R&D in the form of multiplicative
e¤ects between states and controls. This, as shown in Lambertini and Orsini
(2015), yields separated control dynamics and saddle point stability under
the same specication of consumerspreferences and market demand. Oth-
erwise, if state dynamics exhibit a constant e¤ect of R&D e¤orts irrespective
of the level of the state, the rm is bound to come to terms with the unstable
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behaviour of its productive e¢ ciency.
5 Learning-by-doing
One key source of technological development adding itself to R&D e¤orts in
both product and process innovation, can be learning-by-doing. In our model,
learning-by-doing may be accounted for by adopting the same approach pro-
posed by Thompson (2010) and applied by Li and Ni (2016) to extend the
analysis in Lambertini and Orsini (2015). Their main idea amounts to mod-
elling two distinct knowledge accumulation processes, having di¤erent growth
rates. Namely, if we respectively call A(t) and B(t) the knowledge accumu-
lations of process and product innovation in the interval [0; t], we have:
A(t) = A0 + 
Z t
0
k(s)ds; (37)
B(t) = B0 + 
Z t
0
y(s)ds; (38)
where A0 and B0 respectively indicate initial levels of knowledge accumula-
tions, and  and  are positive growth rates. Inserting the instantaneous
costs dened by Thompson (2010) due to learning-by-doing into (3), we ob-
tain a cost function eC() which incorporates such further e¤ects:
eC(t) = c(t)x(t) + bk2(t)  A(A(t)  A0) + sy2(t)  B(B(t) B0); (39)
where A and B are the positive learning rates in the two directions. Con-
sequently, the associated prot function for the monopolistic rm is given
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by
e() = [( x(t))q(t) c(t)]x(t) bk2(t)+A(A(t) A0) sy2(t)+B(B(t) B0):
(40)
Note that the knowledge accumulation functions A(t) and B(t) become ad-
ditional state variables, because they verify the dynamic constraints8>><>>:
_A(t) = k(t)
A(0) = A0
;
8>><>>:
_B(t) = y(t)
B(0) = B0
: (41)
When taking into account the above constraints as well, the maximization
problem amounts to
max
x(t);k(t);y(t)
Z 1
0
e t [[(  x (t)) q (t)  c (t)]x (t)
 bk2(t) + A(A(t)  A0)  sy2(t) + B(B(t) B0)

dt (42)
subject to 8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
_q(t) = k(t)  q(t)
_c(t) =  y(t) + c(t)
_A(t) = k(t)
_B(t) = y(t)
(43)
with the related initial conditions.
The analysis of such a modied problem is more involved than the pre-
vious one, because of the resulting 8  8 Jacobian matrix. This makes it
particularly di¢ cult to calculate eigenvalues for the stability analysis. How-
ever, we are able to provide some insights.
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Reconstructing the optimization procedure yields the following expres-
sions for the derivatives of the control variables:
_k(t) =
_1(t) +  _3(t)
2b
; _y(t) =
  _2(t) +  _4(t)
2s
: (44)
Since we do not have su¢ cient information from the FOCs to reduce them
to two ODEs depending on states and controls only, we can stress that a
solution comes from the 4-equations system where _j(t) = 0 for j = 1; : : : ; 4;
1 and 2 are attached to the dynamics of quality and marginal cost, while
3 and 4 are attached to the dynamics of knowledge accumulation in the
two directions. From the system of necessary conditions, we have12
_3 = 0 =) 3 = A

(45)
_4 = 0 =) 4 = B

(46)
Then, by plugging them into the expressions of k(t) and y(t) and solving for
1 and 2, we obtain 8>><>>:
1 = 2bk   A

2 =  2sy + B

(47)
leading to the following control equations:
_k =
2b(+ )k   A

(+ )  1
4

2   c
2
q2

2b
(48)
_y =
 (  )

 2sy + B


  1
2

   c
q

2s
(49)
12Once again, we omit time dependence whenever possible to save on notation.
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The determination of the steady states of the above equations is analogous
to the one carried out in the absence of learning-by-doing e¤ects. If we call
kLBD and yLBD the controls in this scenario, we can note that
kLBD = kSS +
A
2b
; yLBD = ySS +
B
2s
; (50)
i.e., the steady state values of R&D controls (and therefore also of states)
generated under learning-by-doing can be reached from the previous ones by
a simple translation determined by learning-by-doing, discounting and the
steepness of the instantaneous R&D costs. When learning-by-doing is nil
along both dimensions, the equilibrium structure collapses to the basic one.
To close the analysis carried out in this section, it is worth noting that
the inclusion of learning-by-doing does not modify signicantly the stability
analysis, as the marginal cost dynamics is still responsible for the instability
of the entire system. We have omitted the detailed demonstration of this fact,
which is a straightforward consequence of the form of (4-5) combined with
(48-49), where the nonlinear interplay between states and control persists.
6 Concluding remarks
We have assessed the relationship between the development of di¤erent forms
of innovation carried out by a monopolist over time. The dynamic scenario
we have described provides interesting insights about the properties of the
rms optimal R&D portfolio and the impact of learning-by-doing on the life
cycle of a product or service. The main ndings can be recapped as follows:
30
 Product improvement and process innovation can coexist and the for-
mer may indeed prevail over the latter, if the market is su¢ ciently rich,
i.e., if the richest consumers marginal willingness to pay for quality is
su¢ ciently high.
 When both R&D e¤orts are positive, then they are complements at
equilibrium, thus boosting each other. Equilibrium quality falls short
of the socially e¢ cient level.
 The R&D portfolio of the rm is a¤ected by an intrinsic instability as
its e¤orts to drive marginal cost downwards are bound to fail because
of the dynamics of the latter. Consequently, having a higher quality at
lower production cost and market price may well remain a mirage for
the rm and for its customers alike.
The third result is the most relevant one, in that it exhibits a peculiar
property connecting quality level and market price, which may explain such
market phenomena as products which undergo massive innovation without
any price reduction. However, it is worth stressing that this conclusion is the
outcome of an innite horizon model in which consumers have hedonic pref-
erences. Under di¤erent but equally plausible assumptions, stable equilibria
exists, characterised by increasing quality and decreasing price. For instance,
see El Ouardighi and Kogan (2013) and El Ouardighi (2014), where product
quality exerts a multiplicative e¤ect on a linear market demand function and
the time horizon is nite.
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Further developments of the present line of research can be envisaged. For
instance, it would be relevant to reconstruct the same analysis in an oligopoly
model under feedback information, to deduce possible di¤erences with the
monopolistic market outlined here. Moreover, another issue remains open
to both theoretical and empirical investigation: which production sector is
more a¤ected by the above e¤ects? In other words, is it possible to systemat-
ically identify sectors in which this intrinsic instability does not emerge? An
isolated example is in Lambertini and Orsini (2015), which, however, does
not provide a denitive answer. Hence, this task is left for future research.
32
Appendix
The dynamic properties of the system of state and control equations emerging
from the analysis of the Jacobian matrix (33) can be further illustrated by
considering each of the two 2  2 matrices along the main diagonal of the
4  4 Jacobian matrix deriving from the state-control system made up by
(4-5) and (16-17):
J (q; k; c; y) =
26666666666664
@

q
@q
@

q
@k
@

q
@c
@

q
@y
@

k
@q
@

k
@k
@

k
@c
@

k
@y
@

c
@q
@

c
@k
@

c
@c
@

c
@y
@

y
@q
@

y
@k
@

y
@c
@

y
@y
37777777777775
(51)
This amounts to illustrating the features of the dynamic interplay between
(i) q and k for a given level of c  0 and (ii) c and y for a given level of
q > 0. That is, these two exercises serve the purpose of grasping the nature,
respectively, of quality improvement (or product innovation) for an exogenous
marginal production cost and cost reduction (or process innovation) for an
exogenous quality level. The rst submatrix is
J (q; k) =
26666664
@

q
@q
@

q
@k
@

k
@q
@

k
@k
37777775 =
266664
  1
c2
4bq3
 + 
377775 (52)
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whose trace and determinant are TJ(q;k) =  > 0 and
J(q;k) =   ( + )  c
2
4bq3
< 0 (53)
Since J(q;k) < 0; this side of the rms dynamic problem is stable in the
saddle point sense for any level of the marginal production cost. This fact is
portrayed in Figure A.1, where the arrows illustrate the presence of a saddle
path to the equilibrium.
Figure A.1: The phase diagram in the space (q; k) for a given c
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The second submatrix is
J (c; y) =
26666664
@

c
@c
@

c
@y
@

y
@c
@

y
@y
37777775 =
266664
  1
1
4sq
  
377775 (54)
Its trace is TJ(c;y) =  > 0 while its determinant is
J(c;y) =  (  ) + 1
4sq
(55)
which, in view of the requirement  > ; is positive everywhere. When-
ever the trace and determinant are both positive, the system is necessarily
unstable (see Mehlmann, 1988, p. 145). If J(c;y) > T 2J(c;y)=4; we have an
unstable focus. Otherwise, if J(c;y) 2

0; T 2J(c;y)=4
i
; we have an unstable
node. Here both cases are admissible in line of principle, as the di¤erence
J(c;y)   T 2J(c;y)=4 has the sign of
sq

4 (  )  2+ 1 (56)
where 4 (  ) 2 is nil at  = =2; otherwise it is negative. Hence, in the
special case  = =2, J(c;y) > T 2J(c;y)=4 and the solution of the state-control
system
 
c;

y

is an unstable focus. For any other  < ; it can be either
an unstable focus or an unstable node depending on the values of q and s.
The arising of instability is illustrated by the arrows in the phase diagram
appearing in Figure A.2.
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Figure A.2: The phase diagram in the space (c; y) for a given q
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